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Criminal Procedure

record, or trial in a justice's court, the court could order 1 a material
witness to be released from liability2 resulting from testimony or other
evidence that the witness was required to produce. 3 Chapter 497 provides this immunity only to witnesses called to testify at a grand jury
investigation, trial in a court of record, or preliminary examination. 4
I. 1967 Nev. Stat. c. 523, §373.2, at 1457 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. §178.572). This order
requires a motion from the state requesting a release from liability. /d.
2. /d. (liability for prosecution or punishment).
3. /d.
4. NEV. REv. STAT. §178.572 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 497, §I, at 1346).

Criminal Procedure; burglary-inferences
NEv. REv. STAT. §§205.060, 205.065, 205.2715, 205.312 (amended).
SB 315 (Committee on Judiciary); 1983 STAT. Ch 294
Existing law provides that a judge may not direct the jury to find a
presumed fact 1 against the accused in a criminal action. 2 When a presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the crime, the judge
may submit the issue of its existence to the jury only if a reasonable
juror could find the existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable
doubt, based upon evidence of the proven facts. 3
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 294, anyone breaking and entering4 or unlawfully entering a building was presumed to have the requisite intent to commit grand or petit larceny or a felony therein. 5 In
Hollis v. State ,6 however, the Nevada Supreme Court held that using
this identical language in a jury instruction7 violated the statutory prohibition8 against directing the jury to find a presumed fact. 9 Chapter
294 changes the definition of burglary by replacing the statutory preI. See Ex parte Kline, 71 Nev. 124, 134,282 P.2d 367,371 (1955)(a presumption is a deduction the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts); see also State v. Vaugham, 22 Nev.
285, 299, 39 P.2d. 733, 735 (1985)(a presumption is legitimate where a rational connection exists
between the facts proved and the facts assumed.); see NEv. REV. STAT., §47.230(l)(definition of
presumed fact).
2. NEv. REv. STAT. §47.230(2)(presumptions against accused in criminal actions); see also
Marshall v. State, 95 Nev. 802, 804, 603 P.2d 283, 284 (1979). The jury could be instructed to draw
an inference of guilty knowledge and intent, but could not be directed to do so. /d.
3. NEV. REV. STAT. §47.230(3).
4. /d. §193.010(3),(8) (definition of breaking; definition of entering).
5. 1959 Nev. Stat. c. 22, §I at 19 (amending NEv. REv. STAT. §205.065).
6. 96 Nev. 207, 606 P.2d 534 (1980).
7. /d. at 207, 606 P.2d at 535. The jury instruction in Hollis directed the jury to find criminal intent to commit larceny presumed from the proven facts. /d. The issue of intent was the only
disputed fact at trial. /d.
·
8. NEV. REV. STAT. §47.230(2).
9. Hollis 96 Nev. at 209, 606 P.2d at 535.
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sumption of unlawful intent 10 with a reasonable inference 11 of unlawful
intent. 12
Prior law also provided that any person who leased or rented a vehicle, and willfully failed to return the vehicle to its owner within a seventy-two hour period after the expiration of the lease or rental
agreement, was presumed to have embezzled the vehicle. 13 This pre. sumption was expressly declared unconstitutional by the Nevada
Supreme Court in Sher!ff v. Boyer, 14 because the presumption relieved
the state of its burden of proving the crime of vehicle embezzlement. 15
In apparent response to the Boyer decision, Chapter 294 was enacted to
replace the statutory presumption of vehicle embezzlement with a reasonable inference of guilt. 16 In addition, Chapter 294 makes the identical change in the provisions relating to vehicle larceny. 17
Finally, under existing law, burglary is defined as the unlawful entry
into specified residences, buildings, and conveyances, with the intent to
commit grand or petit larceny or any felony therein. 18 Chapter 294 expands the definition of burglary to include the unlawful entry into any
airplane, glider, or boat. 19
10. See generally Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 157, 164
(1970)(discussion of the constitutional issues involved in statutes that presume intent).
II. Ex parte Kline, 71 Nev. 124, 134, 282 P.2d 367, 371 (1955) (an inference may be defined
as a deduction by the reason of the jury from the facts proved, without an express direction of
law).
12. Compare NEv. REv. STAT. §205.065 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 294, §2, at 718) with
1959 Nev. Stat. c. 22, §1, at 19 (amending NEV. REV. STAT. §205.065).
13. 1963 Nev. Stat. c. 234, §1, at 393 (enacting NEv. REv. STAT. §205.312).
14. 97 Nev. 599, 637 P.2d 834 (1981).
15. /d. at 601, 637 P.2d at 838.
16. Compare NEv. REV. STAT. §205.312 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 294, §4, at 718) wr~h
1963 Nev. Stat. c. 234, §1, at 393 (enacting NEv. REV. STAT. §205.2715).
17. Compare id. §205.2715 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 294, §3, at 718) with 1973 Nev.
Stat. c. 1686, §2, at 6698 (enacting NEV. REv. STAT. §205.2715). The presumption that one in
possession of another's vehicle, without consent, has taken and carried it away, is changed to a
reasonable inference of this unlawful action. Compare NEv. REv. STAT. §205.2715 (amended by
1983 Nev. Stat. c. 294, §3, at 718) with 1973 Nev. Stat. c. 1686, §2, at 6698 (enacting NEV. REV.
STAT. §205.2715).
18. NEV. REV. STAT. §205.060.
19. Compare id. §205.060 (amended by 1983 Nev. Stat. c. 294, §I, at 717) with 1981 Nev. Stat.
c. 295, §1, at 55! (amending NEV. REv. STAT. §205.060).

Criminal Procedure; complaints upon declaration
NEv. REv. STAT. §§171.102, 171.1778, 484.817 (amended).
SB 191 (Committee on Judiciary); 1983 STAT. Ch 188
Prior law provided that a criminal complaint must have been upon
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